We revisit the problem of basing pseudorandom generators on regular one-way functions, and present the following constructions:
Introduction
The seminal work of Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin and Luby (HILL) [12] that one-way functions (OWFs) imply pseudorandom generators (PRGs) constitutes one of the centerpieces of modern cryptography. Technical tools and concepts (e.g. pseudo-entropy, leftover hash lemma) developed and introduced in [12] were found useful in many other contexts (such as leakage-resilient cryptography). Nevertheless, a major drawback of [12] is that the construction is quite involved and too inefficient to be of any practical use, namely, to obtain a PRG with comparable security to the underlying OWF on security parameter n, one needs a seed of length O(n 8 ) 1 . Research efforts (see [13, 11, 21] , just to name a few) have been followed up towards simplifying and improving the constructions, and the current state-ofthe-art construction [21] requires seed length O(n 3 ). Let us mention all aforementioned approaches are characterized by a parallel construction, namely, they run sufficiently many independent copies of the underlying OWFs (rather than running a single trail and feeding its output back to the input iteratively) and there seems an inherent lower bound on the number of copies needed. This is recently formalized by Holenstein and Sinha [14] , in particular, they showed that any black-box construction of a PRG from an arbitrary OWF f requires Ω(n/ log n) calls to f in general. 2 PRGs from Special OWFs. Another line of research focuses on OWFs with special structures that give rise to more efficient PRGs. Blum, Micali [2] and Yao [23] independently introduced the notion of PRGs, and observed that PRGs can be efficiently constructed from one-way permutations (OWPs). That is, given a OWP f on input x and its hardcore function h c (e.g. by Goldreich and Levin [8] ), a single invocation of f already implies a PRG g : x → (f (x), h c (x)) with a stretch 3 of Ω(log n) bits and it extends to arbitrary stretch by repeated iterations (seen by a hybrid argument):
x → ( h c (x), h c (f 1 (x)), . . . , h c (f (x)), . . .)
where f i (x) def = f (f i−1 (x)) and f 1 (x) def = f (x). The above PRG, often referred to as the BMY generator, enjoys many advantages such as simplicity, optimal seed length, and minimal number of calls. Levin [17] observed that f is not necessarily a OWP, but it suffices to be one-way on its own iterate. Unfortunately, an arbitrary OWF doesn't have this property. Goldreich, Krawczyk, and Luby [7] assumed knownregular 4 OWFs and gave a construction of seed length O(n 3 ) by iterating the underlying OWFs and applying k-wise independent hashing in between every two iterations. Later Goldreich showed a more efficient (and nearly optimal) construction from known-regular OWFs in his textbook [5] , where in the concrete security setting the construction does only a single call to the underlying OWF (or ω(1) calls in general). The construction was also implicit in many HILL-style constructions (e.g. [13, 11] ). Haitner, Harnik and Reingold [10] refined the technique used in [7] (which they called the randomized iterate) and adapted the construction to unknown regular OWFs with reduced seed length O(n · log n). Informally, the randomized iterate follows the route of [7] and applies a random pairwise independent hash function h i in between every two applications of f , i.e.
The key observation is "the last iterate is hard-to-invert" [9] , more precisely, function f , when applied to
, is hard-to-invert even if h 1 , . . ., h i−1 are made public. The generator follows by running the iterate O(n/ log n) times, and outputting Ω(log n) hardcore bits per iteration, which requires seed length O(n 2 / log n) and can be further pushed to O(n · log n) using derandomization techniques (e.g., Nisan's bounded-space generator [18] ). The randomized iterate matches the lower bound on the number of OWF calls 5 , but it remains open if any efficient construction can achieve linear seed length and O(n/ log n) OWF calls simultaneously.
Our Contributions. We contribute an alternative proof for the folklore construction of PRGs from known-regular OWFs via the notion of unpredictability pseudo-entropy, which significantly simplifies and tightens the proofs in [5] . We also give a new construction from any unknown-regular one-way function using seed lengthÕ(n) and makingÕ(n/ log n) calls. Here both parameters are optimal up to an arbitrarily close to constant factor, and thus improves the results of the randomized iterate [9] .
PRGs from Known-Regular OWFs. We start by assuming a (t,ε)-OWF f (see Definition 2.2) with known regularity 2 k (i.e., every image has 2 k preimages under f ). The first key observation is that for uniform X (over {0, 1} n ) we have X given f (X) has n + log (1/ε) bits of pseudo-entropy (defined by the game below and formally in Definition 2.5). That is, no adversary A of running time t can win the following game against the challenger C with probability greater than (2 −k · ε). The
The interactive game between A and C that defines unpredictability pseudo-entropy, where x ← U n denotes sampling a random x ∈ {0, 1} n . rationale is that conditioned on any f (X) = y random variable X is uniformly distributed on set f −1 (y) def = {x : f (x) = y} of size 2 k , and thus even if any deterministic (or probabilistic) A recovers a x ∈f −1 (y), the probability that X = x is only 2 −k . Therefore, we obtain the following folklore construction (explicit in [5] and implicit in many HILL-style generators) using three extractions along with a three-line proof. In addition to simplicity, our technique can also be used to refine and tighten the proofs given in [5] (see Section 3.2 for details).
1. f (X) has min-entropy n − k, and thus we can extract nearly n − k statistically random bits.
2. X has min-entropy k given any y = f (X), so we can extract another k statistically random bits.
3. The second extraction only reduces the unpredictability pseudo-entropy of X given f (X) by no more than k (i.e., log(1/ε) bits remaining by the entropy chain rule), and hence we use GoldreichLevin hardcore functions [8] to extract O(log (1/ε)) bits.
The above construction is optimal (in seed length and the number of OWF calls), but requires the knowledge about parameter ε, more precisely, we need ε to decide entropy loss d such that the first extraction outputs n − k − d bits with statistical error bounded by 2 −d/2 (by the Leftover Hash Lemma [12] ) and let the third extraction output more than d bits to achieve a positive stretch. It is unknown how to remove the dependency on ε for free (see also the discussions in [5] ). Fortunately, there is a known repetition trick to solve the problem using seed lengthÕ(n) andÕ(1) OWF calls, where notatioñ O omits a factor of q ∈ ω(1) (i.e. q can be any factor arbitrarily close to constant such as log log log n).
PRGs from Unknown-Regular OWFs. We also give a new construction oblivious of the regularity of f . The key idea is to transform any unknown regular OWF into another known regular OWF (over a special domain). That is, for a (length-preserving) unknown-regular (t, ε)-OWF f : {0, 1} n → Y where
where "⊕" denotes bitwise XOR. It is not hard to see thatf has regularity 2 n (regardless of the regularity of f ) and it preserves the hardness of f . Similar to that observed in the 1st construction,f (Y, R) hides n+log (1/ε) bits of pseudo-entropy about (Y, R), and thus we can extract n+O(log (1/ε)) pseudorandom bits, namely, we get a PRGḡ that maps random elements over Y × {0, 1} n to pseudorandom ones over Y × {0, 1} n+O(log(1/ε)) . Nevertheless, to useḡ we need to efficiently sample from U Y = f (U n ) (i.e. uniform distribution over Y), which costs n random bits despite that the entropy of U Y may be far less than n. Therefore, the construction invests n bits (to sample a random y ∈ Y) at initialization, runsḡ in iterations, and outputs O(log (1/ε)) bits per iteration. The stretch becomes positive after O(n/ log (1/ε)) iterations, which matches the lower bounds of [14] . The seed length remains of order Θ(n) by reusing the coins for universal hash and G-L functions at every iteration, thanks to the hybrid argument. Similarly, in case that ε is unknown, we pay a penalty factorÕ(1) for using the repetition trick. That is, we construct a PRG from any unknown-regular OWF using seed lengthÕ(n) and O(n/ log n) OWF calls.
Preliminaries
Notations and definitions. We use capital letters (e.g. X, Y , A) for random variables, standard letters (e.g. x, y, a) for values, and calligraphic letters (e.g. X , Y, S) for sets. |S| denotes the cardinality of set S. For function f , we let f (X ) def = {f (x) : x ∈ X } be the set of images that are mapped from X under f , and denote by f −1 (y) the set of y's preimages under f , i.e. f −1 (y)
We say that distribution X is flat if it is uniformly distributed over some set X . We use s ← S to denote sampling an element s according to distribution S, and let s ← S denote sampling s uniformly from set S, and y := f (x) denote value assignment. We use U n to denote the flat distribution over {0, 1} n independent of the rest random variables in consideration, and let f (U n ) be the distribution induced by applying function f to U n . We use CP(X) to denote the collision probability of X, i.e., CP(X) def =
x Pr[X = x] 2 , and collision entropy H 2 (X)
We also define average (aka conditional) collision entropy and average min-entropy of a random variable X conditioned on another random variable Z by
An entropy source refers to a random variable that has some non-trivial amount of entropy. A function µ : N → [0, 1] is negligible if for every polynomial poly we have µ(n) < 1/poly(n) holds for all sufficiently large n's. We define the computational distance between distribution ensembles X def = {X n } n∈N and
The statistical distance between X and Y , denoted by SD(X, Y ), is defined by
Simplifying Assumptions and Notations. To simplify the presentation, we make the following assumptions without loss of generality. It is folklore that one-way functions can be assumed to be length-preserving (see [10] for formal proofs). Throughout, most parameters are functions of the security parameter n (e.g., t(n), ε(n), α(n)) and we often omit n when clear from the context (e.g., t, ε, α).
Parameters (e.g. ε, α) are said to be known if they are known to be polynomial-time computable from n. By notation f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l we refer to the ensemble of functions {f n : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l(n) } n∈N .
As slight abuse of notion, poly might be referring to the set of all polynomials or a certain polynomial, and h might be either a function or its description, which will be clear from the context.
Definition 2.2 (one-way functions)
is polynomial-time computable and for any probabilistic algorithm A of running time t(n)
For ε(n) = 1/t(n), we simply say that f is ε(n)-hard. f is a one-way function if it is ε(n)-hard for some negligible function ε(n).
Definition 2.3 (regular functions)
A function f is α-regular if there exists an integer function α, called the regularity function, such that for every n ∈ N and x ∈ {0, 1} n we have
In particular, f is known-regular if α is polynomial-time computable, or is unknown-regular otherwise. Further, f is a (known-/unknown-) regular OWF if f is a OWF with (known/unknown) regularity.
Definition 2.4 (pseudorandom generators[2, 23])
is a (t(n),ε(n))-secure PRG if g is polynomial-time computable and
where (l(n) − n) is the stretch of g, and we often omit 1 n (security parameter in unary) from g's parameter list. We say that g is a pseudorandom generator if both 1/t(n) and ε(n) are negligible.
Definition 2.5 (unpredictability pseudo-entropy [1, 15] ) Let (X, Z) def = {(X n , Z n )} n∈N be a joint distribution ensemble, we say that X has k(n) bits of pseudo-entropy conditioned on Z with respect to all t(n)-time adversaries, denoted by H t(n) (X|Z) ≥ k(n), if for any n ∈ N and any probabilistic adversary A of running time t(n) Pr
Alternatively, we say that X is 2 −k(n) -hard to predict given Z for all t(n)-time adversaries.
Unpredictability pseudo-entropy can be seen as a relaxed form of min-entropy by weakening adversary's running time from unbounded to parameter t(n), which (presumably) characterizes the class of practical adversaries we care about. Note that the notion seems only meaningful in its conditional form as otherwise (when Z is empty) non-uniform attackers can simply hardwire the best guess about X, and thus H t(n) collapses to H ∞ . Let us mention the unpredictability pseudo-entropy is different from (and in fact, strictly weaker than [1, 15] ) the HILL pseudo-entropy [12] , which is another relaxed notion of min-entropy by considering its computationally indistinguishable analogues.
3 Pseudorandom Generators from Regular One-Way Functions
Technical Tools
The first technical tool we use is the leftover hash lemma. Informally, it states that when applying a random universal hash function to min-entropy (or Rényi entropy) source, one obtain random strings that are statistical close to uniform even conditioned on the description of hash function. The objects were later formalized as randomness extractors [19] . Universal hash functions are also good condensers (whose outputs have nearly maximal entropy) for a wider range of parameters than extractors.
Lemma 3.1 (Leftover Hash Lemma [12] ) For any integers d<k≤n, there exists an (efficiently computable) universal hash function family H def = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k−d } such that for any joint distribution (X,Z) where X ∈ {0, 1} n and H 2 (X|Z) ≥ k, we have
where H is uniformly distributed over the members of H, the description size of H is called seed length, and d is called entropy loss, i.e., the difference between the entropy of X (given Z) and the number of bits that were extracted from X. Lemma 3.2 (Condensers from hash functions) Let H def = {h : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} k } be any universal hash function family and let (X,Z) be any random variable with X ∈ {0, 1} n and
Proof. Let X 1 and X 2 be i.i.d. to X | Z = z (i.e. X conditioned on Z = z).
We refer to [20, 4, 16] for extremely efficient constructions of universal hash functions with short description (of length Θ(n)), such as multiplications between matrices and vectors, or over finite fields.
Reconstructive extractors. We will also need objects that extract pseudorandomness from unpredictability pseudo-entropy sources. Unfortunately, the leftover hash lemma (and randomness extractors [19] in general) does not serve the purpose. Goldreich and Levin [8] showed that the inner product function is a reconstructive bit-extractor for unpredictability pseudo-entropy sources. Further, there are two ways to extend the inner product to multiple-bit extractors: (1) multiplication with a random matrix of length O(n 2 ) and extracts almost all entropy (by a hybrid argument); (2) multiplication with a random Toeplitz matrix of length Θ(n) and extracts O(log (1/ε)) bits (due to Vazirani's XOR lemma [22, 8] ). We will use the latter multi-bit variant (as stated below) to keep the seed length linear. Interestingly, the Toeplitz matrix based functions also constitute pairwise independent and universal hash function families. •
• If X is ε-hard to predict given Y for all t-time adversaries, i.e. H t (X|Y )≥ log(1/ε), then we have
where t = t · (ε/n) O (1) and function H C is uniformly distributed over the members of H C .
Remark 3.1 To see the difference between the different versions above, consider the interactive game in Figure 1 , where by unpredictability A's prediction is successful only if x = x , but in contrast A inverts OWF f as long as he finds any x satisfying f (x ) = y. Recall that the proof of the theorem can be seen as an efficient local list decoding procedure for the Hadamard code, where in the former case the decoder returns a random member from the candidate list while in the latter case it goes through all candidates and outputs the one x satisfying f (x ) = y (if exists). We refer to Goldreich's exposition [6] for further details.
We recall two folklore facts below, namely the chain rule of unpredictability (pseudo-)entropy and the replacement inequality. Intuitively, any leakage Y ∈ {0, 1} l decreases the unpredictability about secret X by a factor of no more than 2 l , which can be seen by a simple reduction (e.g., by replacing Y with a random string). The replacement inequality states that any information that is (efficiently) computable from the knowledge of the adversary does not help further reduce the unpredictability (pseudo-)entropy of the secret in consideration. 
where t ≈ t. 
PRGs from OWFs with Known Regularity and Hardness
We state our motivating observation as the lemma below. Lemma 3.3 Let f : X → Y be a 2 k -regular (t,ε)-OWF. Then, we have
where X is uniform over X .
Proof. The (t,ε)-one-wayness of f guarantees that for any deterministic adversary A of running time t [ A(y)∈f −1 (y) ] ≤ ε which in turn implies (as conditioned on f (X) = y, X is uniform over f −1 (y) of size 2 k ):
which is essentially Equation (3) by taking a negative logarithm. Note that the above argument extends to probabilistic t-time A as well, by considering A(y; r) on every fixing of his random coin r.
The Construction for Known α and ε. For joint distribution (X, f (X)), the proposed PRG uses universal hash functions h 1 , h 2 to extract nearly (up to entropy loss) n − k and k bits from f (X) and X respectively, and employs G-L function h c to extract Θ(log(1/εn)) bits of pseudo-entropy from X. For convenience, we assume without loss of generality that the regularity is a power of two, i.e., α = 2 k .
Theorem 3.2 (Preliminary Construction based on Known Regularity and Hardness) Let f :
{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a known 2 k -regular length-preserving (t,ε)-OWF, let d, s be any integer functions satisfying 9d + 6s = 2 log(1/εn), let
be universal hash function families, let H C def = {h c : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} d+s } be a Goldreich-Levin function family, and let g be
where
) )-secure PRG with stretch s. We deal with the situation where n − k − d ≤ 0 by letting h 1 output a dummy string. Another special case k = 0 (i.e., f is a OWP) is handled by letting h 1 and h 2 output the identity and dummy strings respectively.
Proof. The entropy conditions for the (pseudo)-randomness extractions are guaranteed by Lemma 3.4. We have by Equation (4), Equation (5) and the leftover hash lemma that the first n − d bits extracted are statistically random, namely,
Next, as stated in Equation (6), conditioned on the prefix of n − d random bits (and the seeds used), X remains (t − n O(1) , ε)-hard to predict, and thus by Goldreich-Levin (Theorem 3.1)
holds for t = t · (ε/n) O(1) . The conclusion follows by a triangle inequality.
Lemma 3.4 (Entropy conditions) Let f , H 1 , H 2 be defined as in Theorem 3.2, we have
hold for every h 1 ∈ H 1 , h 2 ∈ H 2 , and X uniform over {0, 1} n .
Proof. Equation (4) follows from the regularity of f , i.e., every y = f (x) has 2 k preimages, and thus f (X) is uniformly distributed over a set of size 2 n−k . Equation (5) is due to the chain rule of minentropy (see Fact 3.1). The first inequality of Equation (6) is the replacement inequality (see Fact 3.2), and the second one is obtained by applying the chain rule of unpredictability entropy to Equation (3), i.e.,
Therefore, we already complete the proof for the PRG with linear seed length by doing a single call to any 2 k -regular ε-hard OWF provided that ε and k are known. We provide an alternative (and simpler) proof to that given by Goldreich [5] for essentially the same construction via unpredictability pseudo-entropy.
On Tightening Security Bounds. Concretely, if the underlying OWF is n − log n -(resp., 2 − n 3 -) hard, then the outputs of the resulting PRG will be nearly n − log n 9 -(resp., 2 − n 27 -) close to uniform (with respect to reasonably weakened adversaries than counterparts of the OWF). The main lossy step in the reduction is that we considered function f (x, h 2 )
, where by Equation (6) X is (ε, t)-hard to predict given f (X) and thus we directly applied Equation (2) to get the inferior bounds. However, a closer look at f suggests that it is almost 1-to-1, which implies that f is a OWF (stated as in Lemma 3.5), which allows us to use the tight version of Goldreich-Levin Theorem (see Equation (1)). This is actually the approach taken by [5] , where however f was only shown to be roughly ε 1/5 -hard (by checking the proof of [5, Prop 3.5.9]). We give a refined analysis below to get the tighter √ ε-hardness of f , and this eventually leads to the improved construction as in Theorem 3.3.
Lemma 3.5 Let f and H 2 be as defined in Theorem 3.2, then function f (x, h 2 )
Proof. Suppose for contradiction there exists A of running time t such that
Recall that f (X) has min-entropy n − k and conditioned on any y = f (X) X has min-entropy k, and thus by the condensing property of universal hashing (see Lemma 3.2) we have CP(f (X), H 2 (X) | H 2 ) ≤ 2 −(n−1) and it follows from Claim 3.1 (setting a = 2 −n / √ ε, X 1 = (f (X), H 2 (X)), Z 1 = H 2 ) that f (X, H 2 ) hits set S (defined below) with negligible probability, i.e., Pr[f (X, H 2 ) ∈ S] ≤ 2 √ ε where
Then, let E be the event that A inverts f on any image whose preimage size is bounded by 1/ √ ε, i.e.,
where the probability of hard-to-invertness is related to unpredictability by the maximal preimage size. The conclusion follows by reaching a contradiction to the (t,ε)-unpredictability of X given f (X, H 2 ) (as stated in Equation (6)).
Proof. The proof is a typical Markov type argument. 
Three Extractions are Necessary. We argue that three extractions (using h 1 , h 2 and h c ) seem necessary. One might think that the first two extractions (using h 1 and h 2 ) can be merged using a single universal hash function (that applies to the source (X, f (X)) and outputs n − d bits). However, by doing so we cannot ensure the entropy condition (see Equation (6)) for the third extraction (using h c ).
From another perspective, the merge would remove the dependency on the regularity and thus result in a generic construction that does a single call to any unknown regular OWFs, which is a contradiction to [14] . Furthermore, it seems necessary to extract from X at least twice, namely, using h 2 and h c to get statistically and computationally random bits respectively.
PRGs from Any Known Regular OWFs: Removing the Dependency on ε
The parameterization of the aforementioned construction depends on ε, but sometimes ε is unknown or not polynomial-time computable. It is thus more desirable to have a construction based on any known-regular OWF regardless of parameter ε (as long as it is negligible). We observe that by setting entropy loss to zero (in which case hash functions are condensers) and letting G-L functions extract O(log n) bits the resulting generator is a generic (i.e. without relying on ε) pseudo-entropy generator (PEG) with a (collision) entropy stretch of O(log n) bits. Note however the output of the PEG is not indistinguishable from uniform but from some high collision entropy sources (with small constant entropy deficiency), which implies a PRG by running q ∈ ω(1) copies of the PEG and doing a single extraction from the concatenated outputs.
Definition 3.1 (pseudoentropy generators) A function g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l+e (l > n) is a (t,ε) H 2 -pseudoentropy generator (PEG) if g is polynomial-time computable and there exists a random variable Y ∈ {0, 1} l+e with
where (l − n) is the stretch of g, and e is the entropy deficiency. We say that g is an H 2 -pseudoentropy generator if 1/ε and t are both super-polynomial.
Theorem 3.4 (PEGs from any known-regular OWFs) For the same f , g, H 1 , H 2 , H C as assumed in Theorem 3.2 except that d = 0 and s = 2 log n + 2, we have that if f is a one-way function then g is a H 2 -pseudoentropy generator with stretch 2 log n and entropy deficiency 2.
Proof sketch. It is not hard to see (using Lemma 3.2) that for d = 0 we have
And we have by Lemma 3.5 and Goldreich-Levin the 2 log n + 2 hardcore bits are pseudo-random given H 1 (f (X)) and H 2 (X), which completes the proof.
Theorem 3.5 (PRGs from any known-regular OWFs) For any known k, there exists a generic construction of pseudo-random generator with seed lengthÕ(n) by makingÕ(1) calls to any (lengthpreserving) 2 k -regular one-way function.
Proof sketch. The idea is to run q ∈ ω(1) independent copies of the PEGs as in Theorem 3.4 to get an entropy stretch of 2q log n followed by a single randomness extraction with entropy loss q log n. This yields a PRG with stretch q log n that is roughly O(q·n 2 √ ε + n −q ) computationally indistinguishable from uniform randomness, where n −q is negligible for any q ∈ ω(1).
PRGs from Any Unknown Regular OWFs
The first attempt: a parallel construction. A straightforward way to adapt the construction to unknown regular OWFs is to pay a factor of n/ log n. That is, it is not hard to see the construction for known regularity α = 2 k remains secure even by using an approximated valueα = 2k with accuracy |k − k| ≤ log n. This immediately implies a parallel construction by running n/ log n independent copies of our aforementioned construction, where each i th copy assumes regularity 2 i· log n . Therefore, at least one (unknown) copy will be a PRG and thus we simply XOR the outputs of all copies and produce it as the output. Unfortunately, similar to the HILL approach, the parallelism turns out an inherent barrier to linear seed length. We will avoid this route by giving a sequential construction. Now we present the construction from any (length-preserving) unknown-regular OWF. We first transform it into a hardness-preserving equivalent with known regularity 2 n , as stated in Claim 3.2.
Claim 3.2 For any length-preserving unknown-regular (t,ε)-OWF
Proof. On uniform (y,r) over Y × {0, 1} n , y ⊕ r is uniform over {0, 1} n . Thus, any algorithm invertsf to produce (y, r) with probability ε implies another algorithm that inverts f with the same probability by outputting y ⊕ r. Let us assume that f is α-regular. Then, for any y 1 =f (y, r) = f (y⊕r) we have |f −1 (y 1 )| = α, and for any x ∈ f −1 (y 1 ) we have |{(y, r) ∈ Y × {0, 1} n : y ⊕ r = x}| = |Y| = 2 n /α, which implies |f −1 (y 1 )}| = α · (2 n /α) = 2 n .
Similarly to the known regular case, we first assume ε is known and then eliminate the dependency. Intuitively, the output off hides n bits of min-entropy about its input (by the 2 n -regularity) plus another log (1/ε) bits of pseudo-entropy (due to the one-wayness), and thus one can extract n + O(log (1/ε)) pseudorandom bits. This is formalized in Claim 3.3, where we build a generatorḡ that expands random elements over Y×{0, 1} n into pseudorandom ones over Y×{0, 1} n+O(log(1/ε)) . The proof of Claim 3.3 is similar to that of Theorem 3.2, and we defer it to the appendix. Notice, however, generatorḡ is NOT a practical PRG with positive stretch as the only black-box way to sample distribution U Y is to compute f (U n ), which costs n random bits (despite that H ∞ (U Y ) might be far less than n). Quite naturally and thanks to the hybrid argument, the construction simply iteratesḡ, reuses the random seeds (in each iteration), and outputs s = O(log(1/ε)) bits per iteration. where U Y def = f (U n ), (Y, R) is identically distributed to U Y × U n , and H, H C are uniform over H, H C respectively. where let y 0 := f (x), and for 1≤i ≤ iteratively compute (y i ,r i , z i , h, h c ):=ḡ(y i−1 , r i−1 , h, h c ), h ∈ H, h c ∈ H C , (y i , r i ) ∈ Y × {0, 1} n and z i ∈ {0, 1} s . Then, for any s ≤ log(1/εn)/3, function g is a (t · (ε/n) O(1) − · n O(1) , O( · (2 3s · ε · n) Proof. The proof follows from Claim 3.3 by a standard hybrid argument.
Therefore, for any unknown-regular OWF with known hardness, we obtain a PRG with linear seed length, and by letting s ∈ Θ(log(1/εn)) the number of calls ∈ Θ(n/s) = Θ(n/ log(1/εn)) matches the lower bound of [14] . This extends to the general case (where the hardness parameter is unknown) by repetition.
Theorem 3.7 (PRGs from any unknown-regular OWFs) There exists a generic construction of pseudo-random generator with seed lengthÕ(n) by makingÕ(n/ log n) calls to any (length-preserving) unknown-regular one-way function.
Proof sketch. For any unknown-regular OWF f , defineḡ as in Claim 3.3 except setting d = 0 and s = 2 log n + 1. It is not hard to see that the resultingḡ is a H 2 -pseudoentropy generator with stretch 2 log n and entropy deficiency 1 (proof similar to that in Theorem 3.4). Following the steps sketched in Theorem 3.5, for any q ∈ ω(1) run q independent copies ofḡ followed by an extraction with entropy loss set to qlog n, we obtain a special pseudo-random generatorḡ over spacē
Iteratingḡ for = (qn + 1)/q log n ∈ O(n/ log n) rounds yields a PRG g with stretch s ≥ 1, i.e., g : {0, 1} 2qn ×H q ×H q C → {0, 1} 2qn+s × H q ×H q C which completes the proof.
